Hijacked by injectionPI-0014
Supabase MCP demonstration: support-ticket text tricks coding agent into exposing private database tokens
Instructions addressed to the agent in a support ticket made Claude in Cursor copy a private table of integration tokens into a customer-visible support thread. The agent was connected to Supabase through its MCP server with an admin key that bypasses the database's row-level security. General Analysis ran the test on a fresh project with dummy data. Supabase's documentation already recommended a read-only, project-scoped mode; in September 2025 it described further mitigations and said no customer data leak through MCP had been reported.
Harm: No harm reportedControl level 2, Instruction violation
Not counted · can set the control floorEffect on the index
Near miss. Harm was plausible but prevented. It is rated only on what actually happened.
Sources
How we know
4 sources · single source. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.
- primaryDefense in Depth for MCP ServersSupabase · Sept. 16, 2025supabase.com/blog/defense-in-depth-mcp.md
- researchSupabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database (original post; current page retitled and re-dated)General Analysis · June 16, 2025generalanalysis.com/blog/supabase-mcp-blog
- newsA method that could leak entire SQL databases via AI protocol 'MCP' has been discoveredGIGAZINE · July 9, 2025gigazine.net/gsc_news/en/20250709-mcp-sql-leak
- blogSupabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database (link post)Simon Willison's Weblog · July 6, 2025simonwillison.net/2025/Jul/6/supabase-mcp-lethal-trifecta
Why this rating
No harm reported; control failure level 2
Two assessments. Documented harm sets the reading; a level 4 or 5 control failure on the same record makes that harm count as more than one record. Control alone sets only a floor.
Observed harm
No harm reportedResearcher demonstration on controlled accounts; no victims reported.
Not a finding that no harm occurred.
The harm scale
- 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
- 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
- 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
- 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
- 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.
Control assessment
Instruction violationAgent executed injected SQL using the elevated credentials the developer had configured; inside its permissions.
Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
The control scale
- 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
- 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
- 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
- 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
- 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.
Rating rationale
No external harm was reported from this controlled test. Control level 2 follows the injected-instructions-within-permissions rule.
Effect on the index
It does not count toward the June 16 reading
The reading for the week to June 16, 2025, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.
Not counted: no harm reported. 6 other records behind the reading for that week.
The arithmetic
| Step | With it | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidence | No | — |
| Worst documented harm, ksets the band | — (none counting) | — (none counting) |
| Harms at that level, nposition in the band | 0 | 0 |
| Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts | 3 | 3 |
| Readingrounded down | 3 Control failures only | 3 Control failures only |
Inside the window of 5 weekly readings
| Week to | Reading | Band |
|---|---|---|
| June 16, 2025 | 3 | Control failures only |
| June 23, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| June 30, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| July 7, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
| July 14, 2025 | 2 | Control failures only |
Revisions
What we changed
1 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.
- v1Oct. 7, 2026
First published.
Cite and share
Use this record
Citation
Paperclip Index. “Supabase MCP demonstration: support-ticket text tricks coding agent into exposing private database tokens.” Record PI-0014. Reported June 16, 2025; updated Oct. 7, 2026. Rated under methodology v1.1. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0014