Sunday, November 22, 2026
Paperclip Index
Paperclip IndexControl failures4Control failures onlyA week ago: 9, negligible harmThe Index

Destructive actionPI-0050

Coding agent ran an infrastructure teardown that deleted a course platform's database and snapshots

During a cloud migration, Claude Code used a Terraform state file that also described the DataTalks.Club course platform and issued a destroy operation on both sites. It deleted their infrastructure, a database with 2.5 years of records and the snapshots meant as backups. The founder had asked it to delete only newly created duplicates and leave existing infrastructure alone, and approved the destroy believing it did so; he was running the agent with permission prompts skipped. AWS support restored the data after about a day. In a post-mortem, founder Alexey Grigorev said he had over-relied on the agent.

Harm level 2, Minor harmControl level 2, Instruction violation

Counts in 4 weekly readingsEffect on the index

Extent undisclosed. No source says how far the harm went; it is rated on what is documented.

Sources

How we know

4 sources · single source. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.

  1. primaryHow I Dropped Our Production Database and Now Pay 10% More for AWSAlexey Grigorev / AI Shipping Labs · March 6, 2026aishippingblog.com/p/how-i-dropped-our-production-database
  2. newsClaude Code deletes developers' production setup, including its database and snapshots — 2.5 years of records were nuked in an instantTom's Hardware · March 7, 2026tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/claude-code-deletes-deve…
  3. news'The agent kept deleting files': Developer says Anthropic's Claude Code wiped 2.5 years of dataStoryboard18 · March 10, 2026storyboard18.com/brand-makers/the-agent-kept-deleting-files-developer-says-anth…
  4. blog"Hey Claude, where's my database?": How an AI agent nuked productionRootly · 2026rootly.com/humans-of-reliability/hey-claude-wheres-my-database-alexey-grigorev

Why this rating

Minor harm; control failure level 2

Two assessments. Documented harm sets the reading; a level 4 or 5 control failure on the same record makes that harm count as more than one record. Control alone sets only a floor.

Observed harm

Minor harm

A course platform and its records were unavailable for about a day, then restored.

Services & systems: level 2 (minor) covers an essential service degraded for under 1 hour, or a non-essential service, or the records a service holds for people, unavailable for 15 minutes or more (under 15 minutes is level 1). The extent was not disclosed.

Evidence eligible (bounded single source).

The harm scale
  1. 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
  2. 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
  3. 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
  4. 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
  5. 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.

Control assessment

Instruction violation

The founder instructed the agent to preserve existing infrastructure but allowed a proposed destroy operation, believing it targeted duplicates. Existing infrastructure was deleted: an instruction conflict within granted permissions.

Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.

The control scale
  1. 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
  2. 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
  3. 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
  4. 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
  5. 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.

Rating rationale

Harm level 2: the course platform and its records were unavailable for about a day, then fully restored, and a service or the records it holds for people being unavailable is level 2; affected students and recovery cost are not reported. Control level 2: the founder asked it to remove only new duplicates and leave existing infrastructure untouched, yet it ran a destroy that removed production; he allowed the command believing it targeted duplicates, inside the permissions he had granted.

The scales

Effect on the index

It moved the March 9 reading from 9 to 20

The reading for the week to March 9, 2026, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.

Source: Paperclip Index log, methodology v1.1, week to March 9, 2026.

Counts toward the index. 7 other records behind the reading for that week.

The arithmetic
The reading for the week of March 9, recomputed
StepWith itWithout
Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidenceYes—
Worst documented harm, ksets the band2 Minor1 Negligible
Harms at that level, nposition in the band12
Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts— (none breached)— (none breached)
Readingrounded down20 Minor harm9 Negligible harm
Counted in 4 weekly readings
Week toReadingBand
March 9, 202620Minor harm
March 16, 202620Minor harm
March 23, 20269Negligible harm
March 30, 20269Negligible harm

Recalculated backcasts, not readings published at the time.

Revisions

What we changed

2 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.

  1. v2
    Oct. 13, 2026

    Wording only: rubric shorthand in the rating rationale replaced with plain words; ratings unchanged.

  2. v1
    Oct. 7, 2026

    First published.

Cite and share

Use this record

Citation

Paperclip Index. “Coding agent ran an infrastructure teardown that deleted a course platform's database and snapshots.” Record PI-0050. Reported March 6, 2026; updated Oct. 13, 2026. Rated under methodology v1.1. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0050

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