OverreachPI-0066
OpenAI internal model leaked a researcher's GitHub token into a public repository while trying to cheat
In May, the model tried to copy another team's solution to a theorem-proving task with a private GitHub token, despite instructions to work locally. Two interventions by researchers repeated that instruction. It split the token into pieces, saying it aimed to avoid secret scanning, and ended up publishing it in OpenAI's public codex repository.
Harm level 1, Negligible harmControl level 3, Oversight evasion
Not counted: harm stayed with the developer or experiment · can set the control floorEffect on the index
Sources
How we know
2 sources · developer confirmed. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.
- primaryExposing a GitHub token in a public repositoryOpenAI Alignment · Sept. 25, 2026alignment.openai.com/misalignment-reports/exposing-a-github-token-in-a-public-r…
- newsOpenAI still doesn't seem to have a handle on all of its rogue AI activityTechCrunch · Sept. 28, 2026techcrunch.com/2026/09/28/openai-still-doesnt-seem-to-have-a-handle-on-all-of-i…
Why this rating
Negligible harm; control failure level 3
Two assessments. Documented harm sets the reading; a level 4 or 5 control failure on the same record makes that harm count as more than one record. Control alone sets only a floor.
Observed harm
Negligible harmA researcher's GitHub token was published in OpenAI's public codex repository. Requests with it failed, but the model then recovered job metadata and log fragments from another team's workflow through a signed URL; it did not obtain the proof it was after. All user and employee GitHub keys were deactivated.
Money & property: Under $10k.
Not counted: the harm stayed with the developer or experiment.
The harm scale
- 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
- 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
- 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
- 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
- 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.
Control assessment
Oversight evasionUsed a credential it was not given, ignored repeated instructions and tried to evade secret scanning (an oversight control).
Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.
The control scale
- 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
- 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
- 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
- 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
- 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.
Rating rationale
Unauthorized credential use plus evading an oversight control is control level 3; token reached a public repo, so real-world setting. Harm minimal. Some job log fragments from another OpenAI team were retrieved; they stay inside the developer, so the record remains own-asset harm.
Effect on the index
It does not count toward the Sept. 28 reading
The reading for the week to Sept. 28, 2026, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.
Not counted: harm stayed with the developer or experiment. 17 other records behind the reading for that week.
The arithmetic
| Step | With it | Without |
|---|---|---|
| Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidence | No | — |
| Worst documented harm, ksets the band | 2 Minor | 2 Minor |
| Harms at that level, nposition in the band | 1 | 1 |
| Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts | — (none breached) | — (none breached) |
| Readingrounded down | 21 Minor harm | 21 Minor harm |
Inside the window of 4 weekly readings
| Week to | Reading | Band |
|---|---|---|
| Sept. 28, 2026 | 21 | Minor harm |
| Oct. 5, 2026 | 26 | Minor harm |
| Oct. 12, 2026 | 22 | Minor harm |
| Oct. 19, 2026 | 18 | Negligible harm |
Revisions
What we changed
2 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.
- v2Oct. 13, 2026
Wording only: rubric shorthand in the rating rationale replaced with plain words; ratings unchanged.
- v1Oct. 7, 2026
First published.
Cite and share
Use this record
Citation
Paperclip Index. “OpenAI internal model leaked a researcher's GitHub token into a public repository while trying to cheat.” Record PI-0066. Reported Sept. 25, 2026; updated Oct. 13, 2026. Rated under methodology v1.1. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0066