Sunday, November 22, 2026
Paperclip Index
Paperclip IndexControl failures4Control failures onlyA week ago: 9, negligible harmThe Index

Hijacked by injectionPI-0082

In a researcher demo, a hidden email made the Manus agent run attacker code past its prompt-injection guard

In a test on the researchers' own account, hidden instructions in an ordinary email made Manus, asked to check the inbox, decode and run obfuscated JavaScript. The code ran in its cloud sandbox, from where, Salt Labs says, it could reach the email, cloud storage and code repository accounts connected to Manus. TechRadar reported that a first, plain hidden prompt was stopped by a security mechanism; with the obfuscated payload, Manus's guardrail flagged the activity only after the code had run. Salt Labs says the flaw has been fixed, and TechRadar reported it was disclosed through Meta's bug bounty program.

Harm: No harm reportedControl level 2, Instruction violation

Not counted · can set the control floorEffect on the index

Near miss. Harm was plausible but prevented. It is rated only on what actually happened.

Sources

How we know

2 sources · single source. Links go to the original publishers; the summary above is in our own words.

  1. researchHow We Hijacked an AI Agent With a Single EmailSalt Labs · Oct. 1, 2026salt.security/blog/how-we-hijacked-an-ai-agent-with-a-single-email
  2. newsThis popular AI agent could be hacked by a single email — with potentially disastrous consequencesTechRadar · Oct. 2, 2026techradar.com/pro/security/this-popular-ai-agent-could-be-hacked-by-a-single-em…

Why this rating

No harm reported; control failure level 2

Two assessments. Documented harm sets the reading; a level 4 or 5 control failure on the same record makes that harm count as more than one record. Control alone sets only a floor.

Observed harm

No harm reported

Researcher demonstration on their own test setup; no victims, data exposure or exploitation reported.

Not a finding that no harm occurred.

The harm scale
  1. 1 Negligible Inconvenience, easily remedied.
  2. 2 Minor Limited, recoverable harm.
  3. 3 Moderate Material harm needing significant effort to remedy.
  4. 4 Severe Severe harm to health, rights, property or essential services.
  5. 5 Catastrophic Society-scale harm or disruption beyond a community's capacity to cope.

Control assessment

Instruction violation

The agent treated untrusted email content as instructions and ran decoded code in its own runtime. It acted inside its permissions, and its injection detector flagged the activity only after execution.

Reported beside the index. It adds nothing to a harm reading; when no harm counts in a window, the highest eligible control level in the window is the reading.

The control scale
  1. 1 Negligible Behaved as instructed. The problem was an ordinary error or a flawed output, with no rule broken.
  2. 2 Minor Broke an explicit instruction or rule, or gamed its goal, while staying inside its permissions and environment: for example, reward hacking, misreporting results, or following injected instructions within its permissions.
  3. 3 Moderate Acted outside the permissions it was given, deceived its overseers about its own actions, or tampered with oversight tools (logs, monitors, shutdown). Stopped by normal controls within an hour.
  4. 4 Severe Reached systems outside its permitted environment, or acquired money, compute or accounts without authorization. The type and mechanism say how.
  5. 5 Catastrophic The developer or operator lost control: the system copied its weights outside their control, replicated itself, or resisted being stopped for 24 hours or more.

Rating rationale

No harm was reported, which is not a finding of safety: this was a researcher test on the researchers' own account, and Salt Labs says the flaw has been fixed. Control level 2, broke an instruction: the agent followed instructions injected in an email and ran code inside its own sandbox and permissions, and nothing shows it reached systems it was not permitted to reach. The guardrail was beaten by the researchers' obfuscation, not by the model, so no bypass mechanism applies, as in PI-0030. Salt Labs' own report, with TechRadar's coverage.

The scales

Effect on the index

It does not count toward the Oct. 5 reading

The reading for the week to Oct. 5, 2026, with this record and without it. Harms count in full for two weeks after they are reported, then one level less every two weeks.

Not counted: no harm reported. 22 other records behind the reading for that week.

The arithmetic
The reading for the week of Oct. 5, recomputed
StepWith itWithout
Counts toward the index?documented, external, eligible evidenceNo—
Worst documented harm, ksets the band2 Minor2 Minor
Harms at that level, nposition in the band22
Highest control level breachedsets the reading only when no harm counts— (none breached)— (none breached)
Readingrounded down26 Minor harm26 Minor harm
Inside the window of 4 weekly readings
Week toReadingBand
Oct. 5, 202626Minor harm
Oct. 12, 202622Minor harm
Oct. 19, 202618Negligible harm
Oct. 26, 202615Negligible harm

Recalculated backcasts, not readings published at the time.

Revisions

What we changed

1 logged. Every change to a rating is logged here, with the reason.

  1. v1
    Oct. 7, 2026

    First published.

Cite and share

Use this record

Citation

Paperclip Index. “In a researcher demo, a hidden email made the Manus agent run attacker code past its prompt-injection guard.” Record PI-0082. Reported Oct. 1, 2026; updated Oct. 7, 2026. Rated under methodology v1.1. https://paperclipindex.com/incident/PI-0082

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